INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE vs WORDS OF STATUE

The first and most elementary rule of construction is that the words of a statue must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is called the golden rule of interpretation. This rule is also called “literal rule of Construction”.

The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used in the statute, thus paying attention to what has been said as also to what has not been said. When the words used are not ambiguous, literal meaning has to be applied.

Effect should be given to the plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the Legislature. Intention of the legislature and not the words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may sometimes be possible that the plain meaning of the words does not convey and may even defeat the intention of the legislature; in such cases there is no reason why the true intention of the legislature, if it can be determined, clearly by other means, should not be given effect. Words are meant to serve and not to govern and we are not to add the tyranny of words to the other tyrannies of the world.

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascetained the intention, the court must then strive to so interpret the statute as to promote or advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no neek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anamoly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be well justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing, the written word if necessary.

Parliamentary intention may be gathered from several sources. First, it must be gathered from the statute itself, next from the preamble to the statute, next from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, thereafter from Parliamentary debates, reports of Committees and Commissions which preceded the legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible sources from where there may be light. Regard must be had to legislative history too.

Once Parliamentary intention is ascertained and the object and purpose of the legislation is known, it then becomes the duty of interpreter to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. The words of a statute may not be designed to meet the several uncontemplated forensic situations that may arise. The draftsman may have designed his words to meet 'primary situations'. It will then become necessary for interpreter to impute an intention to Parliament in regard to 'secondary situations'. Such 'secondary intention' may be imputed in relation to a secondary situation so as to best serve the same purpose as the primary statutory intention does in relation to a primary situation.